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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(a)(2007), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16, and Utah Code Ann.§34A-2-801. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Labor Commission properly dismiss Ms. Leavitt's claims for failure to 
prove legal causation under the Allen test where Ms. Leavitt had preexisting conditions 
which contributed to the injury and where the alleged December 2005 industrial incident 
did not constitute an unusual or extraordinary exertion? 
Standard of Review: Discretionary reasonableness and rationality standard. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "the Legislature has granted the Commission 
discretion to determine the facts and apply the law to the facts and this court will uphold 
the Commission's determination unless it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Acosta v. Labor Commission, 44 P.3d 819, 822 (Utah App. 2002). 
2. Did the Labor Commission properly decline to address medical causation where 
Ms. Leavitt failed to meet her burden to prove legal causation? 
Standard of Review: Discretionary reasonableness and rationality standard. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "the Legislature has granted the Commission 
discretion to determine the facts and apply the law to the facts and this court will uphold 
the Commission's determination unless it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Acosta v. Labor Commission, 44 P.3d 819, 822 (Utah App. 2002). 
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3. Did the Labor Commission properly apply the two-part causation test under 
Allen to determine legal causation rather than an outdated an inapplicable standard based 
upon irrelevant statute, case law, and analysis? 
Standard of Review: Discretionary reasonableness and rationality standard. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "[w]hether the Commission erroneously applied the 
Allen test is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed for reasonableness and 
rationality." Acosta v. Labor Commission. 44 P.3d 819, 822 (Utah App. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Leavitt filed two Applications for Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission 
for alleged industrial injuries to her low back sustained on October 12, 2004 with Sinclair 
Oil and on December 7, 2005 with Petroleum Wholesale. (R. Vol. 1 pp.21,81). Ms. 
Leavitt's claims were denied by Petroleum Wholesale based upon legal causation and 
medical causation. (R. Vol. 1 pp.33-40). 
a. The preexisting conditions from the automobile accident. 
Prior to the alleged industrial claims, Ms. Leavitt had extensive preexisting 
conditions at the L4-5 level of her low back related to an automobile accident in 
November of 1991. (R. Vol. 1: p.156-157). On January 15, 1992, Dr. Fosberg obtained a 
CT scan of Ms. Leavitt's lumbar spine that revealed a focal disc tissue herniation at L4-5 
resulting in compression upon the adjacent thecal sac. (R. Vol. 1: p.156-157). On July 8, 
1992, Dr. Schwartz diagnosed Ms. Leavitt with "herniated nucleus pulposes L4-L5 on the 
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left." (R. Vol. 1: p. 157). On November 5, 1992, Dr. Schwartz performed a left L4-5 
hemilaminectomy and discectomy. (R. Vol. 3: pp. 187-88). Dr. Schwartz postoperatively 
confirmed his original diagnosis of "herniated nucleus pulposes L4-L5 left." (R. Vol. 1: 
p. 157). Based upon that evidence, the Labor Commission concluded that the unrefuted 
medical evidence in the case established a preexisting surgically treated herniated disc at 
the L4-5 level of the lumbar spine. (R. Vol. 1: p. 157). 
b. The alleged October 2004 Sinclair event: "no injury'1 
On October 5, 2004, Dr. Pilar Dechet indicated that Ms. Leavitt woke up on that 
date with severe low back pain "without any acute or repetitive trauma." Ms. Leavitt also 
complained of radiation down her extremity and difficulty with mobility. Dr. Dechet 
noted that Ms. Leavitt had a previous L4-5 discectomy for a herniated disc. There is no 
mention in the medical records of any trauma or incident at work at that time. (R. Vol.3: 
p. 137). Ms. Leavitt was employed by Sinclair Oil at that time. (R. Vol. 1: p. 156). On 
October 5, 2004, a lumbar MRI showed large disc protrusion on the left approximately 
1.2 cm across its base. It was noted that the protrusion could be impinging the left L5 
nerve root and possibly the left SI nerve root. (R. Vol.3: pp. 4-5). On October 12, 2004, 
Ms. Leavitt alleges that she sustained an injury to her low back while stacking boxes of 
water bottles for Sinclair Oil. However, when confronted with medical records and date 
inconsistencies during the administrative hearing, she altered the date of the alleged 
industrial incident to October 3, 2004. (R. Vol.1: p.157). 
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On October 12, 2004, Dr. Jaffe noted that Ms. Leavitt had a large left L4-5 disc 
herniation for which Dr. Pilar Dechet had recommended the epidural steroid injections. 
(R. Vol.3: p.8 ]). Injections were performed on that date and again on November 30, 
2004, April 8, 2005, August 12, 2005, and November 22, 2005. (R. Vol.3: pp. 78, 75, 73, 
and 69). Ms. Leavitt testified during the administrative hearing that the November 22, 
2005 injection did not work and that her condition declined as a result. (R. Vol. 5: p. 173). 
She admitted during the hearing that she had to use a cane at work after that date. (R. 
Vol. 5: p. 189). The undisputed evidence at the administrative hearing, including the 
testimony from Ms. Leavitt indicated that Ms. Leavitt never filed an industrial accident 
report or workers5 compensation claim related to the events of October of 2004 until 
filing an Application for Hearing on June 21, 2006. (R. Vol.1, p.158). 
Weighing the evidence presented at the hearing, the Labor Commission concluded 
that "[t]he preponderance of the evidence in this case demonstrated that Ms. Leavitt did 
not suffer a low back injury event arising out of and in the course of her employment with 
Sinclair in October 2004." (R. Vol.1, p. 158). 
c. The alleged December 2005 Petroleum Wholesale event: preexisting back 
problems meant no legal causation. 
On October 19, 2005, Ms. Leavitt became an employee of Petroleum Wholesale. 
(R. Vol. 1: p. 156). On December 5, 2005, Ms. Leavitt called Dr. Jaffe for a surgical 
consult because her left leg went numb. (R. Vol.3, p.68). 
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(1) The December 2005 incident: lifting 21-39 pounds is not an unusual 
exertion. 
On December 6, 2005, one day prior to the alleged December 7, 2005 industrial 
incident, Dr. Jaffe recommended a repeat MRI and follow-up appointment to evaluate for 
surgery. (R. Vol.3, p.68). On December 7, 2005, Ms. Leavitt was working for Petroleum 
Wholesale when she picked up a plastic tote filled with boxes of candy. As she carried it 
around the counter, she felt a "snap and crunch" in her low back. (R. Vol.1, p. 159). Ms. 
Leavitt testified that she moved six or seven totes of candy prior to the one that caused 
her to feel a snap and crunch. Ms. Leavitt testified that the totes containing candy 
weighed approximately 21 pounds each. Dawn Christensen testified that the totes 
containing candy weighed approximately 25 pounds. Robbie Curry testified that the full 
totes of candy weighed approximately 22 pounds. Dave Inlay testified that the candy 
boxes weighed between two and three pounds and came 10 to 12 boxes per tote plus three 
pounds for the weight of the tote. Such observations would yield a minimum weight of 
23 pounds and a maximum weight of 39 pounds per tote. (R. Vol. 1, p. 159). Based upon 
that evidence, the Labor Commission concluded that while carrying a tote weighing no 
more than 39 pounds, Ms. Leavitt experienced a "snap and crunch" in her low back 
accompanied by discomfort. (R. V. 1, p. 159). 
(2) The preexisting back problems: no new injury 
On December 8, 2005, Dr. Jaffe noted that Ms. Leavitt had undergone five L5 
selective nerve root blocks. He indicated that "[a]U previous injections allowed her to 
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walk and function but the last one was not beneficial." "Yesterday, things became worse 
after bending over to put away an order at work." (R. Vol.1, p. 162). On that date, Dr. 
Peggy Ensign obtained an MRI scan of Ms. Leavitt's lumbar spine which was read to 
show persistent left lateral recess disc herniation at L4-L5 without significant change in 
size compared with the October 5, 2004 MRI. (R. Vol.1, p.160); (R. Vol.3, p.3). Dr. 
Jaffe noted that the "MRI taken today shows a recurrent left paracentral L4-5 disc 
herniation." (R. Vol.3, p. 163). On December 8, 2005, Dr. Bauman indicated that "[a] 
repeat MRI scan shows once again, recurrent disk herniation at the L4-5 level on the left, 
pretty much unchanged from MRI scan October of 2004." (R. Vol.3, p. 164) 
(emphasis added). 
(3) The medical opinions that the incident was a continuation of the 
preexisting problems. 
On March 3, 2006, Dr. Jaffe reaffirmed that the MRI obtained on December 8, 
2005 showed the disc at L4-5 was not dramatically different. Accordingly, Dr. Jaffe 
related 35% of Ms. Leavitt's then current symptoms to a December 7, 2005 exacerbation 
and 65% to prior conditions and injuries. (R. Vol.3, p. 57). On April 3, 2006, Dr. 
Knoebel examined Ms. Leavitt and concluded that neither alleged industrial incident 
medically caused Ms. Leavitt's recurrent disc herniation. Specifically, Dr. Knoebel 
concluded that "[t]he 12/7/05 incident was reasonably just a manifestation of the patient's 
continued pre-existing problems." (R. Vol.3, pp. 100-101), On October 31, 2006, Dr. 
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Mark Anderson examined Ms. Leavitt and concluded that neither alleged industrial 
incident medically caused the recurrent disc herniation. (R. Vol.3, p. 35). 
(4) The Labor Commission's decision: no legal causation because the 
preexisting conditions contributed and the December 2005 incident was 
not an unusual exertion. 
On January 10, 2007 an administrative hearing was held at the Utah Labor 
Commission. On April 6, 2007, the Administrative Law Judge denied Ms. Leavitt's 
claims against Petroleum Wholesale based upon the Finding of Fact that Ms. Leavitt 
failed to meet the requirements of legal causation. (R. Vol. 1 p. 160). The Labor 
Commission concluded that Ms. Leavitt's preexisting conditions contributed to the 
alleged December 2005 incident and that such incident did not involve an unusual or 
extraordinary exertion. Because of this, Ms. Leavitt could not prove that her injuries 
were legally caused by the alleged December 2005 incident. On April 17, 2007, Ms. 
Leavitt filed a Motion for Review of the April 6, 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 166-69). On July 12, 2007, the Labor Commission 
entered its Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 184-85). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under Utah law, an injured worker has the burden to prove both medical and legal 
causation to establish a compensable workers' compensation claim. Nyrehn v. Industrial 
Common of Utah, 800 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah App. 1990). The Labor Commission properly 
concluded that Ms. Leavitt failed to meet her burden to prove legal causation under Utah 
law. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "where the claimant suffers from a 
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preexisting condition which contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion 
is required to prove legal causation." Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 26 (Utah 
1986). The undisputed evidence presented at the administrative hearing clearly 
established that Ms. Leavitt had preexisting back conditions which contributed to her 
injury. Indeed, Ms. Leavitt does not dispute that her preexisting conditions contributed to 
the alleged December 2005 injury. Thus, the only disputed issue on appeal is whether the 
alleged industrial incident involved an unusual or extraordinary exertion under Utah law. 
The Labor Commission made findings of fact that "the preponderance of the 
evidence in this case established that as Ms. Leavitt carried a tote full of candy weighing 
no more than 39 pounds she experienced a snap and crunch in her low back." (R.Vol.l, 
p. 159). Based upon the evidence, the Labor Commission concluded that Ms. Leavitt's 
exertions did not amount to an atypical, nonemployment activity. The Labor Commission 
specifically concluded that men and women in nonemployment life typically and routinely 
carry loads of 39 pounds. (R.Vol.l, p. 160). Based upon that analysis, the Labor 
Commission properly dismissed Ms. Leavitt's claims for failure to meet the requirements 
of legal causation under Utah law. 
In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a "two-part causation test" which 
requires an injured worker to prove both legal and medical causation. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated that "compensable injuries can best be identified by first considering the 
legal cause of the injury and then its medical cause." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (emphasis 
added). Where the Labor Commission properly concluded that Ms. Leavitt failed to meet 
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her burden to prove legal causation under Utah law, there is no need to address the issue 
of whether Ms. Leavitt failed to meet her separate and distinct burden to prove medical 
causation ;lah law. 
However, even if medical causation were still a viable issue 011 appeal, the 
evidence demonstrated that Ms. Leavitt could not meet her burden with respect to medical 
causation either. The Labor Commission found that although a dispute existed between 
Jaffe and H concerning apportionment of medical causation, "all of the 
medical professionals agreed that Ms. Leavitt's L4-5 disc herniatioi 1 si u: gically addressed 
on December 9, 2005 represented a recurrence of her low back problems prior to 
December 7, 2005." (R.Vol.l, p. 160). Thus, in the absence of any medical evidence to 
demonstrate industrial n ledical causation, Ms. Leavitt failed to meet her burden to prove 
medical causation under Utah law. Accordingly, her claims were properly dismissed by 
the Utah Labor Commission. 
In Point III of her brief, Ms. Leavitt argues that a legal standard from Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-69, which pertains to apportioning • the Second Inji lry Fi ind on, 
compensable claims, should be utilized in lieu of the two-part causation test set forth in 
Allen. However, the Utah Court of Appeals has specifically stated that cases construing 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 are inapplicable to the issue of causation in that the statute and 
those cases "deal with apportionment of liability between tl le en iployer and tl le 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for benefits which are awarded when there is a preexisting 
condition. Such apportionment occurs subsequent to the determination that benefits will 
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be awarded and therefore is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether benefits will be awarded 
under Allen." Fred Mever v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 800 P.2d 825, 829 FN6 (Utah 
App. 1990). It is well established that the Allen test is to be used in Utah to determine 
whether an injured worker can meet his or her burden of proof to establish legal and 
medical causation. Ms. Leavitt's argument to the contrary is contrary to Utah law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Ms. Leavitt's claims were properly denied and dismissed for her failure to 
meet the burden to prove legal causation where the evidence demonstrated 
that Ms. Leavitt had preexisting conditions which contributed to the subject 
injury and that the alleged December 7, 2005 industrial incident did not 
constitute an unusual or extraordinary exertion under Utah law. 
Ms. Leavitt cannot prevail because the Labor Commission did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the preexisting conditions contributed and that the alleged 
December 2005 incident of lifting from 21 to 39 pounds was not an unusual exertion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "where the claimant suffers from a preexisting 
condition which contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required 
to prove legal causation." Allen v. Industrial Common. 729 P.2d 15, 26 (Utah 1986). The 
Utah Court of Appeals has clarified that: 
The purpose behind the legal causation test for preexisting conditions 
announced in Allen was to distinguish between injuries that coincidentally 
occur al work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms which 
appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace, 
and those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required 
by the employment increases the risk of injury which the worker normally 
faces in everyday life. 
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Acosta v. Labor Comm'n. 44 P.3d 819, 827 (Utah App. 2002). The findings of fact made 
by the Labor Commission demonstrate that Ms. Leavitt had preexisting conditions which 
contributed to her injury and that her exertion was not unusual or extraordinary under 
Utah law. The Labor Commission properly denied N Is, Leavitt's claims for failure to 
meet her burden to prove legal causation. The findings were not an abuse of discretion 
beyond the bounds of reasonableness or rationality. 
A Ihe medical evidence presented to the Labor Commission proved that 
Ms. Leavitt's extensive preexisting conditions contributed to her 
alleged December 7, 2005 industrial injury. 
The medical evidence presented at the administrative hearing chronicled a long 
history of preexisting conditions which contributed to the alleged industrial injury. In 
January ofl992, Dr. Fosberg obtained a CT scan of Ms I,eavitt's lumbar spine that 
revealed a focal disc tissue herniation at L4-5 resulting in compression upoii the adjacent 
thecal sac. (R. Vol. 1: p.156-157). In July of 1992, Dr. Schwartz diagnosed Ms. Leavitt 
with "herniated nucleus pulposes L4-L5 on the left." (R. Vol. I:p.l57). On November 
17, 2002, Dr. Schwartz performed a left. I 1 5 hen lilai i linectomy and discectomy. (R. Vol 
1: p. 157). Dr. Schwartz postoperatively confirmed his original diagnosis of "herniated 
nucleus pulposes L4-L5 left." (R. Vol. 1: p. 157). Based upon that evidence, the Labor 
Commission concluded that the unrefuted medical evidence in the case established a 
preexisting surgically treated herniated disc at tl ic 1 4 5 level of the li u t ibar spii :ic • (R. 
Vol. 1: p. 157). 
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On October 5, 2004, Dr. Pilar Dechet indicated that Ms. Leavitt woke up on that 
date with severe low back pain "without any acute or repetitive trauma." Ms. Leavitt also 
complained of radiation down her extremity and difficulty with mobility. Dr. Dechet 
noted that Ms. Leavitt had a previous L4-5 discectomy for a herniated disc. On October 
5, 2004, a lumbar MRI showed large disc protrusion on the left approximately 1.2 cm 
across its base. It was noted that the protrusion could be impinging the left L5 nerve root 
and possibly the left SI nerve root. (R. Vol.3: pp. 4-5). 
On October 12, 2004, Dr. Jaffe noted that Ms. Leavitt had a large left L4-5 disc 
herniation for which Dr. Pilar Dechet had recommended the epidural steroid injections. 
(R. Vol.3: p.81). Injections were performed on that date and again in November 2004, 
April 2005, August 2005, and November 2005. (R. Vol.3: pp. 78, 75, 73, and 69). Ms. 
Leavitt testified during the administrative hearing that the November 22, 2005 injection 
did not work and that her condition worsened. She testified that she had to use a cane at 
work after that date. 
On December 5, 2005, Ms. Leavitt called Dr. Jaffe for a surgical consult because 
her left leg went numb. (R. Vol.3, p.68). On December 6, 2005, one day prior to the 
alleged December 7, 2005 industrial incident, Dr. Jaffe recommended a repeat MRI and 
follow-up appointment to evaluate for surgery. (R. Vol.3, p.68). 
On December 8, 2005, the day after the alleged industrial incident, Dr. Jaffe noted 
that Ms. Leavitt had undergone five L5 selective nerve root blocks on prior occasions. 
He indicated that "[a]ll previous injections allowed her to walk and function but the last 
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one was not beneficial." (R. Vol.1, p. 162). Dr. Peggy Ensign also obtaii led ai i, N 1R 1 s :ai i 
of Ms. Leavitt's lumbar spine which was read to show persistent left lateral recess disc 
herniation al 1 I-L5 without significant change in size compared with the October 5, 2004 
MRI. (iv. vol.1, p. 160); (R. Vol.3, p.3). Or Jaile i loted that the "MRI taken today shows 
a recurrent left paracentral L4-5 disc herniation." (R. Vol.3, p. 163). On I )ecember 8, 
2005, Dr. Bauman indicated that "[a] repeat MRI scan shows once again, recurrent disk 
herniation at the L4-5 level on the left, pretty much unchanged from MRI scan 
October of 200* * ol.J, p. 164) (emphasis added). 
As outlined above, the medical evidence in this case demonstiahd thai Ms. Leavitt 
had extensive preexisting conditions including a large L4-5 disc herniation. Additionally, 
the objective medical evidence including the December 8, 2005 MRI scan confirmed that 
the large preexisting L4-5 herniation was not significantly different from the prior MRI 
scan. Accordingly, the evidence demonstrated that Ms. Leavitt's lumbar condition as of 
December 8, 2005 was simply a continuation of the recurrent disc herniation at L4-5 
which had been diagnosed on October 5, 2004, more than one year prior to the alleged 
December 7, 2005 industrial injury. 
Based upon the foregoing, Dr. Knoebel and Dr. Anderson concluded that the 
December 7, 2005 industrial incident did not cause Ms. Leavitt's medical conditions and 
that this was simply a continuation of her ongoing preexisting conditions. Even Ms. 
Leavitt's treating doctor, Dr. Jaffe conch ided that tl le her preexisting conditions 
contributed to her injury in the amount of 65%. (R. Vol.3, p. 57). Given this unanimous 
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medical evidence as to contribution of preexisting conditions, the Labor Commission 
properly concluded that Ms. Leavitt's extensive preexisting conditions contributed to her 
injury and that Ms. Leavitt was, therefore, required to prove an unusual or extraordinary 
exertion to meet her burden to prove legal causation under Allen. Certainly the Labor 
Commission did not exceed the discretionary bounds of reasonableness and rationality by 
reaching this conclusion in the face of unanimous medical evidence. 
B. The Labor Commission properly concluded that the alleged December 
7, 2005 industrial incident did not involve an unusual or extraordinary 
exertion under Utah law. 
The Labor Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that lifting 21-39 
pounds was not an unusual exertion. Where an injured worker suffers from a preexisting 
condition which contributes to the injury, "an unusual or extraordinary exertion is 
required to prove legal causation." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. The Utah Supreme Court 
clarified in Allen that "[t]he precipitating exertion must be compared with the usual wear 
and tear and exertions of nonemployment life, not the nonemployment life of the 
particular worker." Id. at 26. The Utah Supreme Court later clarified that "the 
Commission must find that his employment activities involved exertion or stress in excess 
of the normally expected level of nonemployment activity for men and women in the 
latter half of the twentieth century. If such a finding is made, then the requirement of 
legal cause is satisfied because it is presumed that the employment increased the risk of 
injury to which that worker was otherwise subject in his nonemployment life." Price 
River Coal v. Industrial Commission. 731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986). 
14 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth a list of examples of typical activities which ire 
not unusual or extraordinary under a legal causation analysis under Utah law. The court 
stated that "[t]ypical activities and exertions expected of men and women in the latter part 
of the 20th century, for example, ii ICII ide taking full garbage cans to ilu- afreet, lifting and 
carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to 
chest height and climbing the stairs in buildings." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. Thus, industrial 
incidents involving exertions which are at the exertion levels of those listed activities or 
less will not be considered unusual or extraordinary uiuln I II.MII law. Given the specific 
examples, it was certainly not outside the bounds of reasonableness and rationality to 
conclude that lifting 21-39 pounds was not an unusual exertion. 
The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the alleged industrial incident 
did not constitute an unusual or extraordinary exertion under I Itah law Oi I Decei nber 7, 
2005, Ms. Leavitt was working for Petroleum Wholesale when she picked up a plastic 
tote filled with boxes of candy. As she carried it around the counter, she felt a snap and 
crunch in her low back (R Vol 1 p. 159). Ms. Leavitt testified that the totes containing 
candy weighed approximately 21 pounds each. Dawn Christensen testified that tin: totes 
containing candy weighed approximately 25 pounds. Robbie Curry testified that the full 
totes weighed approximately 22 pounds. Dave Inlay estimated and calculated weight of 
23 to 39 pounds based on his eslimnlion flic candy boxes weighed between two and three 
pounds and came 10 to 12 boxes per tote plus three pounds for the weiglit of the tote. 
Such observations from Mr. Inlay would yield a minimum weight of 23 pounds and a 
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maximum weight of 39 pounds per tote. (R. V.l, p. 159). Based upon that evidence, the 
Labor Commission concluded that the preponderance of the evidence established that as 
Ms. Leavitt carried a tote full of candy weighing no more than 39 pounds, she 
experienced a snap and crunch in her low back accompanied by discomfort. (R. V.l, 
p.159). 
The Labor Commission noted that men and women in nonemployment life 
typically and routinely carry loads of 39 pounds. (R. V.l, p. 164). As a result, the 
exertions in carrying a tote that weighed, at most, 39 pounds did not amount to an atypical 
nonemployment activity. Therefore, the claim based upon the December 7, 2005 incident 
was properly dismissed with prejudice for failure to meet the requirements of legal 
causation. 
The Labor Commission's analysis of the exertion was proper and consistent with 
Utah law. It certainly does not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. As 
outlined above, three of the four witnesses, including Ms. Leavitt, testified that the tote 
she was carrying on December 7, 2005 weighed 25 pounds or less. In addition, Dave 
Inlay testified that the totes could weigh from 23 pounds to 39 pounds. The Labor 
Commission was correct in its conclusion that men and women typically and routinely 
carry loads of 39 pounds, and such conclusion is certainly within the bounds of discretion. 
As outlined above, the Utah Supreme Court specifically listed lifting and carrying 
baggage for travel as a typical exertion expected of men and women. Allen, 729 P.2d at 
26. Baggage for travel quite often weighs quite in excess of 39 pounds and airlines 
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typically do not charge extra fees for what they determine to be an "overweight bag" until 
the weight reaches 50 pounds. Thus, baggage weighing less than 50 pounds would be 
considered by the airlines to be typical, usual, and ordinary. A comparison of the exertion 
of Ms. Leavitt on December 7, 2005 as compared with *; • tvpical exertions of men and 
women lifting and carrying baggage for travel supports the Labor Commission's 
conclusion that her exertion was not unusual or extraordinary based upon the language set 
forth in Allen. 
Another specific example of usual and ordinary exertioi I given b> tl le I Ital i 
Supreme Court in Allen is changing a flat tire on an automobile. To remove a flat tire 
with the rim from an automobile involves removing a heavy tire with awkward twisting 
while either bending over or squatting down. That exertion would be greater than the 
exertion of Ms. Leavitt in lifting a 39 pound tote. The Labor Commission's conclusion 
that Ms. Leavitt's exertion was not unusual or extraordinary is entirely consistent with the 
law set forth in Allen. Accordingly, such conclusion is not outside the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationahi and the Labor Commission's ruling should be affirmed. 
The Utah Supreme Court also specifically listed "lifting a small child to chest 
height" as an example of a usual and ordinary exertion in nonemployment life. Data from 
the National Center for Health Statistics indicates that the median weight (50th percentile) 
for 4 year old boys is between 36 and 37 pounds. The data indicates that 4 year old boys 
in the 95th percentile weigh 44 pounds. (See Addendum A). The exertion involved in the 
everyday activity of lifting a four year old child to chest height would not be unusual or 
i / 
extraordinary under the examples listed in Allen. Ms. Leavitt's exertion in lifting a 
plastic tote weighing 39 pounds or less involved less exertion than lifting an average-
sized four year old to chest height. Accordingly, Ms. Leavitt's exertion was not unusual 
or extraordinary under Utah law and the Labor Commission properly found that Ms. 
Leavitt failed to meet her burden to prove legal causation. The Labor Commission 
certainly did not step outside of the scope of reasonableness or rationality in light of these 
specific examples of ordinary exertion. 
II. The issue of medical causation need not be addressed where Ms. Leavitt failed 
to meet her burden to prove legal causation. 
Under Utah law, an injured worker has the burden to prove both medical and legal 
causation to establish a compensable workers' compensation claim. Nyrehn v. Industrial 
Common of Utah. 800 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah App. 1990). In Allen, the Utah Supreme 
Court adopted a "two-part causation test" which requires an injured worker to prove both 
legal and medical causation. The Utah Supreme Court stated that "compensable injuries 
can best be identified by first considering the legal cause of the injury and then its 
medical cause." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (emphasis added). 
As outlined above, Ms. Leavitt failed to meet her burden to prove legal causation. 
In the absence of proof of legal causation, the issue of medical causation is not relevant 
because Ms. Leavitt's claims cannot be compensable, regardless of whether Ms. Leavitt is 
able to prove medical causation. Accordingly, the Labor Commission properly denied 
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and dismissed Ms. Leavitt's claims regardless of the evidence as to medical causation and 
did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
However, even if the Labor Commission had determined that Ms. Leavitt met her 
burden to establish legal causation, w 1 licl i it did i lot. the medical evidence was still 
insufficient to meet Ms. Leavitt's burden to prove medical causation. Under Allen, if the 
injured worker is able to prove legal causation, only then does the tribunal move to the 
second i fthe two-part causation test-medical causation. "Under the medical cause 
test, the claimant must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise tl lat tl ie stress, strain, or 
exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting injury or disability. In the 
event the claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, compensation should be 
denied." Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. Under the evidence and findings of fact made by the 
Labor Commission, Ms. Leavitt cannot meet her burden to prove a medical eat isation 
connection. Accordingly, Ms. Leavitt's claims were properly denied and dismissed. 
As outlined above, Ms. Leavitt had long standing preexisting back problems. She 
was specifically diagnosed with a large recurrent herniation at L4-5 prior to the alleged 
December 7, 2005 industrial incident. On December 6, 2005, one day prior to the alleged 
December 7, 2005 industrial incident, Dr. Jaffe recommended a repeat MRI and follow-
up appointment to evaluate for surgery. (R. Vol.3, p.68). Objective diagnostic medical 
evidence obtained through multiple KIRI scans demonstrated that there was essentially no 
change in the preexisting herniation through the incident that occurred on December 7, 
2005. (R. Vol.1, p.160); (R. Vol.3, p.3); (R. Vol.3, p. 164). After reviewing her history 
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and conducting an examination, Dr. Knoebel concluded that the alleged industrial 
incident did not medically cause Ms. Leavitt's disc herniation. (R. Vol.3, pp. 100-101). 
Instead, it was a recurrence of her preexisting back problems. Additionally, on October 
31, 2006, Dr. Mark Anderson examined Ms. Leavitt and concluded that the alleged 
industrial incident did not cause the recurrent disc herniation. (R. Vol.3, p. 35). 
Although the MRI scans demonstrated that Ms. Leavitt's condition on December 
8, 2005 was simply a continuation of extensive preexisting conditions including the 
previously diagnosed large disc herniation at L4-5, Ms. Leavitt attempts to rely upon 
statements made by Dr. Jaffe to argue for medical causation. However, on March 3, 
2006, Dr. Jaffe reaffirmed that the MRI obtained on December 8, 2005 showed the disc at 
L4-5 was not dramatically different. At that time, Dr. Jaffe related 35% of Ms. Leavitt's 
symptoms to a December 7, 2005 exacerbation and 65% to prior conditions and injuries. 
(R. Vol.3, p. 57). This opinion from Dr. Jaffe does not meet Ms. Leavitt's burden to 
prove medical causation under Utah law. In fact, that medical record from Dr. Jaffe 
demonstrates Dr. Jaffe's opinion that although Ms. Leavitt may have experienced some 
increased symptoms on December 7, 2005, the majority of her symptoms were a 
continuation of preexisting nonindustrial conditions. When that opinion is read in 
conjunction with Dr. Jaffe's conclusion from that same report that the MRI scan showed 
no change in condition, it is clear that Dr. Jaffe did not conclude that Ms. Leavitt's 
condition and need for surgery were medically caused by the alleged December 7, 2005 
20 
industrial incident. Simply put, one may have increased symptoms from an event that did 
not cause the underlying condition. 
The Labor Commission properly denied Ms. Leavitt's claims for failure to meet 
her burden to prove legal causation. Based upon the medical evidence, as outlined 
above, Ms. Leavitt could not have met her additional and separate burden to prove 
medical causation. Accordingly, Ms. Leavitt's arguments regarding medical causation 
should be disregarded because (1) in the absence of proof of legal causation, the issue of 
medical causation is irrelevant; and (2) the medical evidence was insufficient to prove 
industrial medical causation with respect to the December 7, 2005 industrial incident. 
Accordingly, Ms. Leavitt's claims were properly denied and dismissed. Given the 
evidence, the Labor Commission certainly did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality. 
III. Ms, Leavitt's argument regarding the alleged October 12, 2004 industrial 
incident not being a bar to the compensability of the December 7, 2005 
industrial claim is based upon statute, case law, and analysis which is 
irrelevant to the issue of causation under Allen. 
In Point III in her Brief, Ms. Leavitt argues that the October 2004 injury does not 
bar relief as a preexisting injury for benefits for the December 2005 injury. The relied 
upon authority is inapplicable and irrelevant. Ms. Leavitt cites to analysis from Chavez v. 
Industrial Commission, 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985) in support of an argument that the 
December 7, 2005 industrial incident should be deemed compensable. It appears that the 
Chavez case is actually properly cited as Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 709 
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P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985). However, Kaiser Steel contains analysis and a standard which is 
inapplicable to the instant case and irrelevant to the issues of causation and 
compensability. 
In Kaiser Steeh the issue presented was whether the Labor Commission erred in 
finding the Second Injury Fund [now called the Employers' Reinsurance Fund] liable for 
compensation. In that case, a Medical Panel concluded that the injured worker was 33% 
impaired before the industrial accident due to arthritis and pulmonary condition with a 2% 
increase in impairment due to the industrial accident. The Labor Commission concluded 
that the Second Injury Fund had no liability based upon the finding that the additional 2% 
impairment was minimal. The Utah Supreme Court cited to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
69(1)(1973), the statute pertaining to Second Injury Fund liability in effect at that time, 
which stated that the Second Injury Fund must pay compensation when an employee with 
a previous permanent incapacity sustains an industrial injury "that results in permanent 
incapacity which is substantially greater than he would have incurred had he not had the 
preexisting incapacity." Kaiser SteeU 709 P.2d at 1170. The parties in Kaiser Steel 
focused on whether the 2% additional impairment caused by the industrial accident was 
"substantially greater" under the statute pertaining to Second Injury Fund liability. Id 
From the language contained in Kaiser SteeL Ms. Leavitt argues that this court 
should adopt a standard that the December 2005 alleged injury should be compensable if 
"the worker's total incapacity following the second injury is 'substantially greater' than it 
would have been but for the preexisting incapacity." Id. However, this standard is 
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completely inapplicable to the issues and facts of the instant case. As outlined above, 
Kaiser Steel deals with a statutory standard for apportionment involving the Second 
Injury Fund as between preexisting injuries and an industrial injury. There is no basis for 
applying that irrelevant standard to the instant case. In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has specifically stated that cases construing Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 are inapplicable to 
the issue of causation in that they "deal with apportionment of liability between the 
employer and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for benefits which are awarded when 
there is a preexisting condition. Such apportionment occurs subsequent to the 
determination that benefits will be awarded and therefore is irrelevant to the inquiry of 
whether benefits will be awarded under Allen." Fred Meyer v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah. 800 P.2d 825, 829 n.6 (Utah App. 1990)(emphasis added). 
As set forth previously in this brief, the correct standard to be used for determining 
compensability is the two-part causation test set forth in Allen. Additionally, the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Fred Meyer specifically concluded that the standard in Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-69 is irrelevant to the issues of causation under Allen. Although the 
evidence in the instant case clearly demonstrates that Ms. Leavitt did not sustain a 
"substantially greater permanent incapacity" following the alleged December 2005 
industrial incident, it is not necessary to reiterate such facts where such standard is 
irrelevant to the issue of causation under Utah law. Accordingly, Ms. Leavitt's arguments 
in Point III, which are based upon an inapplicable and irrelevant standard, should be 
disregarded in favor of the law set forth in Allen. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Labor Commission did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality in this case. Ms. Leavitt failed to meet her burden to prove legal causation 
under Utah law. Ms. Leavitt also could not have met her burden to prove medical 
causation under Utah law. The standard which Ms. Leavitt urges this Court to utilize in 
addressing the issue of causation is irrelevant and contrary to the analysis set forth in 
Allen. The Labor Commission properly made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
which were supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the Labor Commission factual 
findings and conclusions of law should not be disturbed because they do not exceed the 
scope of reasonableness and rationality. 
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ADDENDUM A 
National Center for Health Statistics 
"Stature-for-age and 
weight-for-age percentiles" 
2 to 20 years: Boys 
Stature-for-age and Weight-for-age percentiles 
NAME 
RECORD # 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Published May 30,2000 (modified 11/21/00) 
SOURCE. Developed by the National Center for Health Statistics in collaboration with 
the National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (2000) 
http://www.cdc.gov/growthchai1s 
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